⚡
Edge Playgroundby Judith Medina — Akamai Solutions Engineering
EdgeWorkers · Use case 1

Akamai turns your client certificate into a signed identity

mTLS ends at the Akamai edge, so Akamai is the only component that has seen your certificate. Instead of passing that identity on in plain headers that anything in between could change, an EdgeWorker signs a 60-second ES256 JWT and sends it to the origin. The origin checks it with the public key only: it can trust the identity, but it can never forge one.

① Client certificate (mTLS)→② Akamai: cert → registered client→③ EdgeWorker signs JWT→④ Origin verifies with JWKS
checking hostname…
1Request

Call the protected API

Your browser calls /api/whoami over the mTLS connection. You send no token: the identity comes only from the certificate in the handshake.

Press Call the API to start.
⚙ What happened at the edge (Akamai config)
  • Enforce mTLS settings: CA set edge-playground-clients · deny if no / invalid certificate
  • Remove any client-sent X-EP-Identity and Akamai-CC-* headers
  • Set Variable (Hidden): certificate status, issuer, subject, serial, SHA-256 fingerprint
  • EdgeWorker: status ok → issuer pinned → (optional subject rule / kill switch) → sign ES256 with the certificate's identity → X-EP-Identity
  • Missing, expired, revoked or untrusted certificate → 403 at the edge, the origin never sees it
  • Which operator may use the API → decided by the origin (API gateway), not by Akamai
2Token

The identity token the origin received

This is exactly what arrived at the origin in X-EP-Identity — printed here for the demo (a real service never displays or logs it).

—
Header
—
Payload (claims)
—
What each claim proves
—
Call the API first.
3Origin

Verified by the origin

The origin plays F5 / the API gateway: pinned JWKS, public key only.

  • Waiting for a response…
4Browser

Re-checked in your browser

An independent check against jwks.json with Web Crypto. Re-runs when the token expires.

  • Waiting for a token…
5Attacks

Try to break it

Each attempt should be rejected. A green result means the protection worked.

Try it
    6Unregistered

    Valid certificate, operator not onboarded

    op-unknown-99 is signed by the same trusted CA, so Akamai vouches for it and issues its token: Akamai keeps no list of operators. The origin, playing the API gateway (3scale), verifies the token and then refuses it with 403 operator_not_onboarded. Authentication happens at the edge, authorization downstream.

    curl
    curl -s --cert op-unknown-99.crt --key op-unknown-99.key \
      https://mtls.edge-playground.magicnest.site/demos/edgeworkers/mtls-jwt/api/whoami
    # HTTP 403  {"verified":true, "authorization":{"decision":"denied","reason":"operator_not_onboarded"}, …}
    7No certificate

    No certificate, or a bad one

    This page is public: it holds no data. What is protected is the API. Without a valid, registered client certificate it answers 403 with a reason code, issues no token and nothing reaches the origin. The page reads that 403 and explains on screen why the call was denied.

    curl
    curl -s https://mtls.edge-playground.magicnest.site/demos/edgeworkers/mtls-jwt/api/whoami
    # HTTP 403  {"error":"forbidden","reason":"client_certificate_missing", …}
    What to say

    Akamai is the only one that saw the certificate, so Akamai is the one that vouches for it — with a signature, not a header. Every hop behind it can verify that signature with the public key, and none of them can create one. The token lives 60 seconds, is bound to the certificate (cnf), to this exact method and URL (htm/htu) and has a unique id (jti), so a copy found in a log is worthless. And this is a few hundred lines of JavaScript on the edge, not a new identity platform.