Identity JWT issued by Akamai from mTLS
An API is exposed to external partners that authenticate with a client certificate. mTLS ends at Akamai, so Akamai is the only one that has seen the certificate. Instead of forwarding the identity in plain headers that any hop could alter, an EdgeWorker signs a 60-second ES256 JWT with what the certificate says. Every service behind it verifies with the public key, none can forge an identity, and the API still decides which operators it accepts.
⚙ How it is built (Akamai config)
- Hostname mtls.edge-playground.magicnest.site · CPS edge certificate, TLS 1.3, mTLS with CA set edge-playground-clients
- Enforce mTLS settings: deny without a valid client certificate
- Remove client-sent X-EP-Identity / Akamai-CC-* headers · Set Variable (Hidden): cert status, issuer, subject, serial, SHA-256 fingerprint
- EdgeWorker: status ok + issuer pinning → ES256 JWT (iss, sub, aud, exp 60 s, jti, cnf.x5t#S256, x5_subject, x5_issuer, x5_serial, x5_exp, htm/htu) → X-EP-Identity · fail closed
- Origin: verifies alg, kid against a pinned JWKS, signature, iss, aud, exp/nbf, htm/htu
https://mtls.edge-playground.magicnest.site/demos/edgeworkers/mtls-jwt/What to say
Akamai is the only one that saw the certificate, so Akamai vouches for it — with a signature, not a header. Everything behind it can check that signature with the public key and nothing behind it can create one. 60-second lifetime, bound to the certificate and to the exact call, so a token copied from a log is worthless.